Economists have tended to view cap and trade (or, more generally, emissions pricing) as more cost-effective than a clean energy standard (CES) for the purpose of reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity generation. This stems in part from the finding that, in terms of cost-effectiveness, a CES relies too much on emissions abatement through the channel of fuelswitching and too little on the channel of reduced electricity demand.
Introduction
Although there currently is little action on U.S. climate change policy at the Congressional level, such policy is being actively conducted by the Executive Branch -by the U.S Environmental Protection Agency under the auspices of the Clean Air Act.
1 In addition, climate change policy is being pursued through various initiatives by several U.S. states. The CES is an example of an intensity requirement: it focuses on the ratio of inputs of clean electricity to total inputs of electricity to utilities. 4 Economists give intensity standards mixed reviews in terms of their ability to reduce emissions. On the positive side, they tend to view intensity standards as superior (on cost-effectiveness grounds) to some conventional policy approaches: they appreciate the fact that, in contrast to specific technology mandates, intensity standards give firms or facilities the flexibility to choose whatever production method meets the standard at lowest private cost.
On the negative side, economists tend to view intensity standards as less cost-effective than policies that simply establish a price on each unit of emissions, as is the case with emissions taxes or systems of tradable emissions allowances. As shown by Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) , input-based intensity standards are formally identical to the combination of an emissions tax and input subsidy, with the implied revenue-loss from the subsidy identical to the revenue gain from the tax. As discussed below, even if the intensity standard leads to the efficient ratio of use of clean to "dirty" (higher-polluting) production inputs, the subsidy component tends to promote inefficiently high demands for inputs in general, which sacrifices cost-effectiveness. 5 Indeed, Holland et al. show that an intensity standard intended to promote the use of cleaner fuels in the gasoline blend can result in an increase in emissions from fuels -because it promotes an inefficiently high demand for gasoline in general.
This would suggest that, as a policy to reduce carbon dioxide emissions associated with the production of electricity, the CES is less cost-effective than a cap-and-trade program or carbon-based emissions tax applied to the electricity sector. However, theoretical work by Parry and Williams (2010) indicates that the CES might fare considerably better on cost-effectiveness grounds once one accounts for interactions with the tax system. Because of the subsidy component, the CES leads to a lower price of electricity than a cap-and-trade system (or carbon tax) that promotes the same emissions reduction. Apart from tax interactions, this would sacrifice cost-effectiveness, as lower electricity prices limit the extent that emissions will be reduced through the channel of lower electricity demand. However, as indicated below, lower electricity prices have a virtue in the presence of tax interactions: they imply a smaller adverse "taxinteraction effect." Theory suggests that this offsetting benefit could potentially make the CES nearly as cost-effective as -or even more cost-effective than -the equivalent emissions price policy. The issue merits further analysis: as indicated below, prior theory does not account for other factors that can significantly affect the relative cost of the CES, and quantitative assessments have been lacking. This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to assess the costs of achieving given reductions in greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the CES. It compares the CES's costs with those under cap and trade (C&T). We first employ an analytical model that compares the costs while taking account of tax-interactions as well as other incentive effects not considered in prior theoretical work. The analytical model indicates that the relative costeffectiveness depends on the nature and extent of prior tax-distortions, on the stringency of the CES policy, on substitutability between various forms of electricity generation, and on specifics of the CES policy design. We then apply a numerical general equilibrium model of the U.S. to attain quantitative results and arrive at more specific policy conclusions. The numerical model combines details on the U.S. energy system with details on the U.S. tax system, thus permitting an assessment of the tax interactions. The numerical simulations yield quantitative assessments of how the relative cost of the two types of policy depends on the various factors identified by the analytical model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and applies the analytical model. Section 3 presents the numerical model, and Section 4 indicates the data used by that model. Section 5 describes the policy simulations and presents the simulation results. The final section offers conclusions.
An Analytical Model
This section presents a relatively simple analytical model that illustrates the tradeoffs between a CES and C&T (or a carbon tax), along with key factors that determine the relative efficiency of these two instruments.
The Model
A representative agent consumes two private goods, X and Y, and a public good G, and supplies capital (K) and labor (L). The agent's utility function is given by ,
where U is continuous, quasi-concave, and twice-differentiable. This function is increasing in the first three arguments (the two private goods and the public good) and decreasing in the last two 4
arguments. The numerical model that follows is fully dynamic and explicitly models capital accumulation. For simplicity, this analytical model is static and thus ignores the dynamics of capital accumulation, instead simply assuming that the provision of capital causes disutility to the agent (implicitly representing the disutility of postponing consumption, which cannot be explicitly represented in a static model). Thus, in this model, capital is very similar to labor.
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The agent's budget constraint is given by ,
where p Y is the price of good Y, , and are the tax rates on Y, labor income and capital income, and w and r are the prices of labor and capital (i.e., the wage and rate of return). Good X is the numeraire, so its price is normalized to one.
The agent maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2), taking prices, tax rates, and the quantity of the public good as given. This yields the consumer first-order conditions:
where is the marginal utility of income.
Goods X and G are non-polluting. For simplicity we assume that they have identical production technologies. Thus, production of these goods is given by ,
where K X and L X are the quantities of capital and labor used in production of X and G. The production function for good Y is similar, except that production of good Y generates pollution (Z). Pollution is a joint product, but is represented here as an input. Thus, the production of Y follows .
Both production functions are quasi-concave and twice-differentiable, and exhibit constant returns to scale. Pollution is not priced by the free market but is subject to an emissions tax, .
Production of good Y is also subject to a tax at the rate . Both industries are perfectly competitive, so firms take all prices as given while maximizing profits, which gives the firm firstorder conditions for production of X and G 6 An alternative interpretation of the analytical model would view K not as labor, but as a second type of labor. All of the model's results would remain unchanged under that interpretation.
;
and for production of Y ; ; .
The market for capital must clear (i.e., capital supplied must equal capital used in production)
and the same is true for labor .
The government uses tax revenue to finance provision of the public good. 7 The government budget constraint follows .
Taken together, equations (1) through (10) implicitly define utility, all prices, and all quantities as functions of the four tax rates. Each policy -the CES or C&T -can be represented as a revenue-neutral combination of an increase in the pollution tax ( ) and a reduction in one of the other tax rates. As indicated in the introduction, the CES is equivalent to a pollution tax combined with a negative tax (i.e., a subsidy) on good Y. And under the assumption that the permits are auctioned and the revenue used to reduce taxes on capital and/or labor income, cap and trade is equivalent to a pollution tax combined with a reduction in and/or .
Taking a total derivative of utility (1) with respect to , substituting in the consumer first-order conditions (3), subtracting total derivatives of the production functions (4) and (5) with respect to , substituting in the firm first-order conditions (6) and (7), substituting in total derivatives of the factor-market clearing conditions (8) and (9) and the government budget constraint (10) with respect to , and rearranging yield an equation for the marginal change in welfare for a marginal change in either the CES or C&T:
.
This equation shows that the money-equivalent change in utility 8 is equal to the sum of four terms, each of which represents the effect of a particular distortion. Each of these terms is 6 equal to the size of the distortion (i.e., the tax rate) times the change in quantity in the distorted market. In each case, the tax puts a wedge between the marginal social cost and marginal social benefit for the taxed good, and thus any change in quantity has a corresponding effect on welfare.
Effects of Cap & Trade
Cap and trade is equivalent to a pollution tax combined with a reduction in and/or .
Thus, in this case, the terms will include the effect of the change in and the effects of the changes in and/or . And in this case, there is no tax or subsidy on Y. Thus, for the C&T case, (11) can be rewritten as .
The first term on the right-hand side of (12) is the direct cost of the policy: the cost that comes from the effect on emissions (which is the same as the first term in (11)). The next two terms are what Goulder (1995) termed the "tax-interaction" effect: the welfare effect that arises when environmental policy interacts with tax distortions in factor markets. The final two terms are the "revenue-recycling" effect: the welfare effect of using revenue from environmental policy to finance tax rate cuts for distortionary taxes.
To aid in interpretation of equation (12), it is useful to define the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) for the taxes on capital and labor. The MCPF for a given tax is the marginal welfare cost per dollar of revenue raised using a given tax. The MCPF for the capital tax is given by (13) and the MCPF for the labor tax is surplus -all of which are equal for a marginal change -for the policy change.
In each of these expressions, the numerator is the cost to the representative agent of a marginal increase in the tax, while the denominator is the marginal revenue from that tax increase. Thus, the ratio gives the marginal welfare cost per dollar of marginal revenue. Each expression is a "non-environmental" MCPF: that is, each takes into account the effects in the taxed factor markets, but not any effects on emissions or the quantity of the polluting good.
Using (13) and (14), (12) can be rewritten as ,
where is the MPCF for the mix of tax cuts enabled by the pollution tax revenue. This is a weighted average of the MCPFs of the capital and labor taxes given by ,
where and are the shares of marginal revenue devoted to cutting capital and labor taxes, respectively (note that we assume all revenue is used for cutting one tax or the other, implying that ). Again, this expression can be divided into a direct effect (the first term), a taxinteraction effect (the second term), and a revenue-recycling effect (the third term).
Under the assumption that X and Y are separable in utility from K and L, equation ( 
where is again a weighted average of the MCPFs of the capital and labor taxes, with the weights corresponding to how much taxing Z affects the real returns to capital and labor. Thus, ,
where and are the shares of the burden of that fall on capital and labor, respectively (and where ).
Effects of a Clean Energy Standard
The clean energy standard is equivalent to a pollution tax combined with a negative tax (i.e., a subsidy) on good Y. Thus, in this case, the terms will include the effect of the increase in and the decrease in . In addition, these terms will also include the effects of changes in and/or -which might at first seem strange, because the CES does not raise any revenue. But there still may be changes in the tax rates on capital and labor in this case, because the CES may affect the quantities of capital and labor, thus indirectly affecting revenue and requiring offsetting tax rate changes in order to keep total government revenue constant. In this case, then, (11) can be rewritten using the MCPF expressions (13) and (14) to give .
This expression parallels expression (15) for the cap and trade case. The first two terms on the right-hand side are the direct welfare effect of the CES, which comes from how the CES affects pollution emissions and the quantity of the polluting good. The third term (i.e., the rest of the right-hand side) is the tax-interaction effect.
This tax-interaction effect can be broken into two pieces, corresponding to the effect of the emissions-tax component of the CES and the effect of the output-subsidy component (which appear in (19) as the term in parentheses times the first two terms in the curly brackets and times the third term in the curly brackets, respectively). The expression for the first of these piecesthe one for the emissions-tax component of the CES -is exactly the same as the expression for the tax-interaction effect in the C&T case. The second piece -for the output-subsidy component -is analogous, though it will typically have the opposite sign, implying a welfare gain, not a loss, because it is caused by a subsidy, not a tax. As a result, the tax-interaction effect is generally more positive (i.e., a smaller welfare loss or larger gain) for the CES than for C&T. However, the CES does not produce any gain from the revenue-recycling effect, unlike in the C&T case.
As in the C&T case, under the assumption that X and Y are separable in utility from K and L, this equation can be further rewritten as
. (20) where is analogous to , but with the weights depending on the shares of the burden of rather than .
Comparing Marginal Costs under the Two Policies
In order to compare the costs under the two policies, it is useful first to convert the expressions for marginal welfare changes into expressions for the marginal cost per unit of emissions reductions. In each case, this is accomplished by dividing through by . For the C&T case (starting from equation (17)), this gives ,
and for the CES case (starting from equation (20)), it gives .
We can then use these expressions to look at key determinants of the relative marginal costs of cap & trade versus a clean electricity standard.
Policy Stringency:
There are two main ways in which the stringency of the policy (i.e., the amount of emissions reductions achieved) will affect the relative costs of the policies. Both tend to favor C&T as the policy becomes more stringent. The first is well-known from prior work that ignores general-equilibrium effects: the direct costs tend to be higher under CES, because the CES does much less to reduce consumption of the polluting good, and the magnitude of that disadvantage grows as the policy becomes more stringent. Thus, the sum of the first two terms in (22) will be larger than the first term in (21), and that difference will tend to grow as the policies become more stringent.
The second reason is that as policy becomes more stringent, the direct cost terms become more important relative to the general-equilibrium terms. This is clear from examining (21) and (22): the direct-cost terms are proportional to and , which are initially zero and increase as the policies become more stringent. In contrast, the general-equilibrium terms depend on Z and Y, which will tend to shrink as the policies become more stringent. This means that increasing stringency will favor whichever policy fares worse with these general-equilibrium terms. In general, that could be either policy. But for cases in which the overall costs of the two policies are similar, that will be C&T: because C&T has lower direct costs, if the overall costs are similar between the two policies, then it must be because the general-equilibrium terms are more favorable to CES. Thus, a more stringent policy, by making those terms relatively less important, will tend to favor C&T.
Average MCPF of the Taxes that Are Reduced Using C&T Revenue:
C&T will tend to fare better when the revenue it generates is used to cut a more distortionary tax than when it is used to cut a less distortionary tax. This is evident in equation (21): a higher boosts the magnitude of the revenue-recycling term relative to the taxinteraction term. The intuition here is obvious: cutting a more distortionary tax provides a bigger efficiency gain than cutting a less distortionary tax. No such effect shows up for the CES, which doesn't raise revenue.
MCPF for the Factor that Is Disproportionately Connected to the Polluting Good:
A CES will tend to fare better when the tax on the factor that is more tightly linked to the polluting good is more distortionary (e.g., if , then a higher relative to will tend to favor the CES). This is evident from examining the last term in (22): that term lowers the cost of the CES, and a larger will increase the magnitude of that term relative to other terms. The CES's implicit subsidy for the polluting good tends to lower the cost from the tax-interaction effect, and that becomes more important when the tax on the factor more tightly linked to that polluting good is particularly distortionary.
Factor Intensity in Production of the Polluting Good for the More Distorted Factor:
The CES will also tend to fare better when the polluting good is more tightly connected to the factor subject to the more distortionary tax (e.g., if , then a higher will tend to favor CES). This arises for the same reason as the previous result: this tends to magnify the taxinteraction-effect advantage of the CES by boosting . One highly important influence on and is the factor intensity in production of Y: the more capital-intensive Y is, the higher will be, while the more labor-intensive Y is, the higher will be.
A Numerical Model
Here we describe and present results from an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with international trade. The model generates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for the U.S. and the rest of the world under specified policy scenarios. The key agents are producers of various goods and services, a representative household, and the government. The model captures interactions among these agents, whose actions generate supplies and demands for various commodities and productive factors. It solves for all variables at yearly intervals beginning in the benchmark year 2010.
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The model combines a detailed U.S. tax system with a detailed representation of energy production and demand. The detail on taxes is key in capturing the interactions of environmental initiatives (like the CES or emissions pricing) and the tax system, as well as the significance of alternative ways to "recycle" potential any policy-generated revenues. Below we offer a brief description of the model. A detailed description is provided in Goulder and Hafstead (2013) .
Producer Behavior
The model divides U.S. production into the 24 industry categories listed in Table 1 . This division gives particular attention to energy-related industries, as it identifies separately oil and natural gas extraction, coal mining, electric power, petroleum refining, and natural gas distribution. The specification of energy supply incorporates the nonrenewable nature of crude petroleum and natural gas and the transitions from conventional to backstop fuels. The electricity sector includes three types of generators, distinguishing coal-fired electricity generation, otherfossil electricity generation, and non-fossil electricity generation. 10 It also includes "Electric Utilities" that purchase electricity from the generators on the wholesale market and are responsible for transmission and distribution of electricity.
General Specifications. In each industry, a nested production structure is employed with constant-elasticity of substitution functional forms at each nest. In all industries except the oil and natural gas extraction industry, production exhibits constant returns to scale: each industry is therefore modeled via a representative firm. Each industry produces a distinct output (X), which is a function of the inputs of capital (K), labor (L), an energy composite (E), a non-energy (or materials) composite (M), and the level of investment (I) 11 :
The energy composite is made up of the outputs of the energy industries, while the materials composite consists of the outputs of the other industries:
where i x is a composite of domestically produced good from industry i and its foreign counterpart. 12 Industry indices correspond to those in Table 1 .
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In the model, the nonrenewable nature of oil and gas stocks is captured by the specification of a reserve of the domestic oil & gas resource. This reserve is reduced according to the amount of production (extraction) each year. Productivity in the oil & gas industry is a decreasing function of the remaining reserve; hence extraction becomes more costly as reserves are depleted. In making profit-maximizing extraction decisions, oil and gas producers account for the effect of current production on future production costs. The domestic price of oil and gas is given by the exogenously specified world price of oil gross of tariffs. The model includes a include nuclear, hydro, solar, and wind generators.
11 In each industry, capital (K) is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregate of structures and equipment.
12 The functions f, g, and h, and the aggregation functions for the composites E, M, and i
x are CES and exhibit constant returns to scale.
"backstop fuels industry" that provides a perfect substitute for oil and gas. We assume that the technology for producing backstop fuels on a commercial scale becomes known only in the year 2020. We assume that backstop fuels have the same carbon content as oil and gas.
14 The model incorporates technological change exogenously for each industry in the form of
Harrod-neutral (labor-embodied) technological progress at the rate of two percent per year.
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Investment. In each industry, managers choose the level of investment to maximize the value of the firm. The investment decision takes account of the adjustment (or installation) costs represented by
where δ is the rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock and ξ is the marginal adjustment cost.
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The attention to adjustment costs distinguishes this model from most other economy-wide general equilibrium models. These costs imply that capital is imperfectly mobile across sectors. 
where τ a is the corporate tax rate (or tax rate on profits), p is the per unit output price net of output taxes, w is the wage rate net of indirect labor taxes, L τ is rate of the indirect tax on labor,
EMCOST is the cost to the firm of energy and materials inputs, i is the gross-of-tax interest rate 14 In reality, some potential backstops (e.g., shale oil) have higher carbon content than others (e.g., biofuels).
15 There is no explicit modeling of the invention of relatively new and evolving technologies such as carbon capture and storage. Such technologies may become very important in the longer run but are less likely to be critical during the time-interval 2009-2030 on which we focus. 16 The variable φ captures the notion that there is an output loss associated with installing new capital as inputs are diverted to install the new capital.
paid by the firm, DEBT is the firm's current debt, TPROP is property tax payments, DEPL is the current gross depletion allowance, and DEPR is the current gross depreciation allowance.
Based on the cash-flow identity linking sources and uses of the firm's revenues, one can derive the following expression for the value of the firm:
. Equation (28) indicates that the equity value of the firm is the discounted sum of after-tax dividends net of new share issues. In each period, managers choose investment levels as well as cost-minimizing inputs of labor and intermediate inputs to maximize this equity value.
Household Behavior
Household behavior stems from decisions by an infinitely-lived representative agent that chooses consumption, leisure, and savings in each period to maximize its intertemporal utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. The representative household has constant-relativerisk-aversion utility over "full consumption" C, which is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution composite of consumption of goods and services ( C  ) and leisure (  ). C  is a Cobb-Douglas composite of 17 consumer goods, i C . 17 In turn, each consumer good i C is a constant-elasticityof-substitution composite of domestically and foreign produced goods. At each nest in the household's demand system, the household allocates its expenditure to obtain the composite associated with that nest at minimum cost.
The Government Sector
The public sector is represented by a single agent representing all levels of government.
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, purchases goods and services, and hires labor. Overall government expenditure is exogenous and increases at a constant rate, g, equal to the steady-state growth rate of the model. In the benchmark year, 2010, the government deficit is 2.6 percent of GDP. In the reference (status quo) simulation, the deficit-GDP ratio is approximately constant.
In the policy experiments in this paper, we require that the real deficit and real government spending follow the same path as in the reference case. Thus, the time-profile of the government's real tax receipts in the CES and C&T policy cases must be the same as in the reference case. Revenue-neutrality is accomplished through lump-sum adjustments (i.e., rebating C&T auction revenue via dividend checks) or through adjustments to the marginal tax rates applying to individual income (wages, interest income, dividends, and capital gains) or corporate profits.
Foreign Trade
Except for oil and gas imports, which are perfect substitutes for domestically produced oil and gas, imported intermediate inputs and consumer goods are imperfect substitutes for their domestic counterparts. Import prices are exogenous in foreign currency, but the domestic currency price changes with changes in the exchange rate. Export demands are modeled as functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign income (in foreign currency). The foreign price is the price in U.S. dollars plus tariffs or subsidies, converted to foreign currency through the exchange rate. We impose the assumption of zero trade balance at each period of time. An exchange rate adjusts in each period to achieve balanced trade.
Modeling the CES and C&T
The model offers a flexible treatment of both the CES and C&T, allowing for alternative specifications as to the time-profile of the regulations and the industries covered.
CES. The CES policy applies to electric utilities, affecting their demands for electricity from the three types of generators (coal-fired, other fossil, and non-fossil).
Let denote the standard in period t. This constraint can be expressed by ,
The left-hand side is the ratio of "clean" electricity to total electricity demanded by the utility.
The product in the numerator and denominator is the quantity of electricity purchased in period t from generator i by the electric transmission and distribution industry, where x it is the quantity in units of the model's data and is a scaling coefficient that converts these units into megawatt hours. The symbol a i in the numerator is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the generator type qualifies for the standard, and zero otherwise. 18 Since 0 1, t M < < electricity from qualifying generators is subsidized, while power from non-qualifying generators is taxes.
Producers minimize the cost of variable inputs subject to the constraint in (29). As shown in Appendix A, the constrained cost minimization problem can be replicated with an unconstrained cost minimization problem with the introduction of a revenue-neutral tax and subsidy scheme, where the utility receives a subsidy for the input of qualifying electricity and pays a tax on the input of non-qualifying electricity. Specifically, the tax on electricity from generator i is given by ,
where is the unique "price" such that satisfies , thus making the tax-subsidy combination revenue-neutral.
C&T. Cap-and-trade programs can vary along several dimensions, including the point of regulation, the nature of allowance allocation, and the presence of absence of provisions for allowance banking, borrowing, or offsets. To make a clean comparison between the costeffectiveness of the CES and C&T programs, we introduce C&T policies that match the point of regulation of the CES. Thus we only consider C&T applied to the electric utility sector.
Additionally, to simplify the analysis, we primarily focus on policies with 100 percent auctioning without banking and borrowing or offset provisions.
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E t , total emissions from electricity generation in period t, is expressed by ,
where again is the input (in model units) of generator i in period t, and is the carbon intensity of generator i in period t. Under a C&T program implemented for the electric utility sector, the utility must hold and submit emissions allowances corresponding to the emissions generated by the production of the electricity it purchases. Let denote the price to the utility of electricity produced by generator i, inclusive of the cost of emissions allowances associated with a unit of electricity. Then can be expressed as: (32) where is production cost excluding the allowance cost. By affecting the p iu 's associated with electricity from each type of generator, C&T influences the utilities' demands for electricity from the various generators. 
Equilibrium
In each period, the requirements of equilibrium are that: (1) labor supply equals its demand, (2) savings equals investment, and (3) government expenditure equals tax revenue less the exogenously specified government deficit. Under simulations of C&T policies, an additional equilibrium condition is that the demand for emissions allowances equals the supply (or cap).
In each period, market clearing is achieved through adjustments in output prices, the market interest rate, and lump-sum taxes or tax rates. 21 In simulations of C&T policies, the price of carbon adjusts such that the aggregate demand for allowances (given by aggregate emissions 20 C&T also can affect the generators' production methods. The demand by utilities for from generator i is a function of p iu , which in turn is a function of the emissions associated with generator i's production. To the extent that a generator recognizes this connection, it has an incentive to reduce these associated emissions. For example, coalfired generators will have an incentive to reduce the amount of coal needed to generate a unit of electricity. In our simulations, we assume that generators are aware of this connection. Under these circumstances, a C&T program applied to utilities according to the emissions embodied in the electricity they purchase is equivalent to a C&T program imposed directly on the emissions from the generators. In our simulations of C&T the cap is applied directly to the generators.
21 By Walras's Law, the required number of equilibrating variables is one less than the number of equilibrium conditions. The numeraire is the nominal wage.
from covered sectors) equals the aggregate supply each period. We impose perfect foresight on all agents' expectations. 
Data and Parameters
Here we sketch some main components of the data and parameter inputs to the numerical model and their sources. Detailed documentation on the 2010 data set used for this analysis is provided in Goulder and Hafstead (2013) .
Data
Industry 
Parameters

Production Parameters
The model employs production function elasticities of substitution derived from estimates by Dale Jorgenson and Peter Wilcoxen. We translate the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen estimates of 22 To solve for the equilibrium, we apply a two-step algorithm similar to that of Fair and Taylor (Fair and Taylor, 1983) . First we solve the model in each period for the market clearing prices, interest rates, and taxes given a set of expectations. We then iterate until we find expectations consistent with the intertemporal equilibrium condition of perfect foresight.
parameters for translog cost functions into elasticities of substitution parameters to make them compatible with the constant-elasticity-of-substitution function form of our model. The capital adjustment cost parameters are based on Summers (1981) . For the retail sector that purchases electricity from the three generators, in our central case we employ a value of 3 for the elasticity of substitution across electricity from the different generator types. Although electricity from different sources is highly substitutable, we assume less than perfect substitutability to account for regional capacity constraints. In the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2 we employ other values for this important parameter.
Household Parameters
The elasticity of substitution in consumption between goods and leisure, υ, is set to yield a compensated elasticity of labor supply of 0.4. 23 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, σ, equals .5. 24 The intensity parameter α C is set to generate a ratio of labor time to the total time endowment equal to .44. These parameters imply a value of 0.19 for the interest elasticity of savings between the current period and the next.
Emissions Parameters
Carbon dioxide emissions coefficients are set to match the distribution of emissions from energy consumption by source in 2010. 25 Coefficients convert the input of coal and oil into emissions.
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Results
23 This lies midway in the range of estimates displayed in the survey by Russek (1996) . 24 This value falls between the lower estimates from time-series analyses (e.g., Hall (1988) and the higher ones from cross-sectional studies (e.g., Lawrance (1991) .
25 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Review 2011. 26 The aggregation of reported emissions sources (electric power, transportation, commercial, residential, and transportation) differs from the model industry aggregation. To match emissions by source, we make the following assumptions: a) the coal coefficient for all industries except coal fired electricity generators is equal; b) the oil coefficient for all industries except petroleum refining, other fossil electricity generation, and natural gas distribution are equal.
Reference Case
All simulations begin in the year 2010. We first perform a reference case simulation that assumes business-as-usual conditions and forms the reference path against which we measure the effects of policy shocks. Table 1 shows the levels of real output of each industry in the reference case in 2010, in billions of 2010 dollars.
Policy Results
CES and Cap-and-Trade Policies: Central Case Simulations
We start with a focus on CES policies that are similar to those in the Obama/Bingaman proposal in terms of what qualifies as "clean" electricity. As in those proposals, non-fossilgenerated electricity is given full credit and natural-gas-fired electricity is given half credit.
(Coal-fired generation is considered "dirty" and receives zero credit.) Later we consider alternative specifications where we vary the credit level received by natural-gas-fired generators.
We will use the term "CES ratio" to refer to the required minimal ratio of clean generation (in megawatt-hours) to total generation. In our simulations, the CES ratio begins with the business-as-usual ratio in 2013 and increases through time, ultimately settling at some targetvalue in the year 2035. As mentioned in subsection 3.5 above, the CES is equivalent to a revenue-neutral tax and subsidy program, where the utility's electricity purchase involves either a tax or subsidy depending on whether the electricity is produced through "clean" generation. Figure 3 displays the shadow tax and subsidy rates applying to the electricity from the three generators. For each generator i, these correspond to τ it in equation (30) above. From 2013 through 2035, the shadow tax on electricity from coal-fired generators tends to rise. This reflects the increasing stringency of the CES over time and the associated need to induce greater substitution away from coal-fired electricity. Starting in 2035, the CES ratio is held constant, and the shadow tax no longer increases. (Indeed, it falls.) The pattern for non-fossil-generated electricity is the opposite of that for coal-fired electricity. Non-fossil-generation is deemed clean and receives a subsidy, which tends to increase through 2035. Electricity from "other-fossil" (principally natural-gasfired) generation is an intermediate case. In the central case simulations considered here, "other fossil" generators receive partial credit. In the initial years of the policy, the required CES ratio is less than the partial credit, which from equation (30) implies that other-fossil-generated electricity receives a subsidy. Over time, the CES ratio is increased. It eventually exceeds the credit and the subsidy becomes a tax.
To allow for a clean comparison of the CES and C&T policies, the emissions caps for the electricity sector for each year are set to match the emissions that result from that sector under the CES policies. 28 In these initial comparisons, the C&T policy involves auctioning 100 percent of the emissions allowances, with revenues recycled through cuts in the marginal income tax rates.
(Below we will assess how alternative methods of revenue-recycling affect the costs of the C&T policy, absolutely and relative to the costs under the CES.) Figure 4 compares the CES and C&T policies in terms of their impacts on the present value of GDP over the interval 2013-2035. Except in the case with the least stringent CES, the GDP costs of the CES are greater than those of C&T, although the disadvantage is small when the policies are not stringent. As indicated above, the CES does not require electric utilities to pay for the emissions that remain once they have met the required CES ratio. Hence their marginal costs of production and electricity prices are lower in the case of CES than in the C&T case. As a result, the CES triggers less reduction in the demand for electricity than the C&T policy, and it must rely more on fuel-substitution to achieve the needed emissions reductions. The results in Figure 4 suggest that this disadvantage of the CES is not fully offset by the CES's advantage in producing a smaller tax-interaction effect.
Figure 5 also displays the relative costs of the two policies, in this case in terms of the equivalent variation welfare measure. Again the relative costs depend on stringency. Under the equivalent variation welfare measure, the CES is less costly at low levels of stringency. The results suggest that as stringency increases, the CES's disadvantage in terms of its inability to exploit the demand-reduction channel increases in importance relative to its advantage in terms of its lower tax-interaction effect. Figure 6 contrasts the impacts of the CES and C&T policies on the demand for electricity.
Because electricity prices are higher under C&T than CES, the quantity of electricity demanded is lower in the C&T case. In the long run, the demand reduction is more than twice as large as in the C&T policy in the 20 percent emission reduction policy, and about 1.8 times larger in the 40 percent reduction policy. C&T raises electricity prices more, it has a more pronounced effect on the price level than the equivalent CES policy. The difference in the price increases is relatively small in the early years of the policy, but the difference is increasing over time as the policies become more stringent.
These differing impacts in prices underlie the differences indicated earlier in the costs of the two policies. Cap and trade's larger price impacts imply a larger tax-interaction effect. In Figure 7 , the deviation in percentage increases in prices is largest for the most stringent policy, although the ratio of these percentage increases declines with stringency.
Isolating the Tax-Interaction Effect
We now examine results from counter-factual simulations in which we have altered the level of pre-existing taxes. This enables us to isolate and assess the impact of the tax-interaction effect, since the magnitude of the tax-interaction effect is positively related to the levels of such taxes. Figure 8b compares the same policies across scenarios differing in terms of pre-existing corporate income tax rates.
As predicted by the analytical model, the level of welfare costs for both the CES and C&T policies are increasing in the level of pre-existing taxes. Additionally, the ratio of the CES policy's welfare cost to that of the CES policy is decreasing in the size of pre-existing taxes. This confirms the relative advantage of the CES in terms of a smaller tax-interaction effect. Figure 9 shows the ratio of welfare costs (CES/C&T) under a range of credits to natural gas. As the credit received by natural gas generated electricity increases, the relative cost of CES decreases. The relative cost is minimized on the chart between 0.6 and 0.7. 31 Unless natural-gasgenerated electricity receives the optimal credit, the CES will not induce fully efficient substitutions between carbon-based fuels. In contrast, a C&T system that charges a uniform price for CO 2 emissions in theory will promote the most cost-effective fuel-switching pattern.
Alternative CES Specifications: Partial Credit for Natural Gas
Alternative Cap-and-Trade Specifications
In most of the C&T policies considered above, emissions allowances were auctioned and the revenues were recycled through cuts in the marginal rates of personal income taxes.
However, the method of revenue-recycling can affect the relative costs of C&T and the CES. Figure 8 revenue-neutrality is achieved through lump-sum recycling of the policy-generated revenues. As a result, the benefit associated with each dollar returned to the private sector is the same (one dollar), regardless of the level of pre-existing taxes. If instead the recycling were in the form of cuts in existing income tax rates, the value of the recycling would depend on the pre-existing marginal rates. This added dimension would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. 31 Using 2010 emissions, the ratio of emissions per megawatt hour of natural gas generated electricity to coal-fired electricity is 0.38. Thus, the emissions intensity of natural gas falls short of that of coal by .62, which is within the range of the optimal credit in our simulations (between 0.6 and 0.7)
case we have focused on earlier. "C&T, Auctioning, Lump-Sum Rebates" refers to the case where revenues are returned to households lump sum. "C&T, Free Allocation" refers to the case where all of the allowances are distributed free to generators.
The results in this figure reveal circumstances where the CES is less costly than C&T. As prior studies have emphasized, 32 the costs of C&T increase when auction revenues are returned lump-sum (rather than via marginal rate cuts) or when allowances are given out free. As shown in these figures, when C&T has these features it can be more costly than the CES, even when the policy is not very stringent. Here we consider values of 2 and 4 as well. As expected, both the level of welfare costs and the relative cost of CES to cap-and-trade is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution across generators. When the elasticity is high, it is easy to for electric utilities to substitute between generators and therefore the aggregate price increases and welfare losses will be reduced. As discussed, the CES relies more heavily on this substitution than C&T, which makes more efficient use of the channel of reduced overall demand for electricity. Because of the greater weight attached to substitution under the CES, greater substitutability enhances the relative attractiveness of the CES policy. Symmetrically, lower substitutability reduces the relative attractiveness of CES.
Further Sensitivity Analysis
Conclusions
32 See, for example, Parry and Oates (2000) . and Goulder et al. (1999) . 33 The CES target is 2035 is varied across alternative labor supply elasticities such that the level of emissions reductions is constant across policies.
In a realistic economy with prior taxes on factors of production, the CES has a potential attraction relative to an electricity-sector C&T program: it produces smaller tax-interaction effect. This raises the possibility that the CES might not suffer a disadvantage relative to cap and trade on cost-effectiveness grounds.
This paper has employed analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of the CES and an electricity-sector C&T program. Numerical simulations indicate that a well-designed CES is more cost-effective than the most efficient form of C&T when relatively minor reductions in emissions are called for, but less cost-effective when greater reductions are required. To achieve maximal cost-effectiveness, the CES needs to offer partial credit to natural-gas-fired electricity. The CES can more easily overtake C&T in terms of cost-effectiveness when the C&T program involves free allowance allocation or when revenues from auctioned allowances are rebated lump sum.
Although emissions pricing remains an exceptionally attractive vehicle for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, these results demonstrate that the advantage of such pricing in terms of cost-effectiveness is less clear once interactions with the tax system are taken into account. As climate change policy continues to evolve at the state and federal levels in the U.S., reducing emissions from coal-fired power plants is likely to remain a priority. States may increasingly rely on renewable portfolio standards (the state-level equivalent to a federal CES), and federal policy discussions may continue to consider the CES as well as emissions-pricing policies such as a federal carbon tax. In assessing these policy options, it is important to consider the interactions with the tax system, since as indicated here such interactions significantly affect their relative costs. 
